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“Is Hong Kong Democratizing?” 
 
Abstract: 
 
We argue that the transition to Chinese authority has not undermined democratic 
governance in Hong Kong and that voice and accountability have improved since the 
handover. We seek to explain this surprising result and conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings for China, Taiwan and cross-strait relations. 
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“Is Hong Kong Democratizing?” 
 
 In June of 2007, a forum was held in Beijing to mark the tenth anniversary of the 
implementation of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution and the embodiment of 
Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” policy.  At the forum, the chairman of the 
National People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo, issued a stern warning that Hong Kong did 
not enjoy ‘residual powers’ in areas not explicitly granted to it by Beijing, declaring that, 
“However much power the central government decides to assign to the SAR [special 
administrative region], this is what the SAR gets.”1  The message was unambiguous: 
political reform in Hong Kong, including the possibility of implementing universal 
suffrage, would only evolve as far as China’s central government wanted it to.  In spite of 
this and other stern warnings from Beijing, however, an assessment of Hong Kong’s 
movement toward democracy over the past ten years reveals the surprising conclusion 
that the transition to Chinese authority has not undermined democratic governance in 
Hong Kong; on the contrary, political voice and accountability have shown a marked 
improvement. 
These findings challenge the pessimism that accompanied Hong Kong’s handover 
ten years ago (see, e.g., Hicks 1987, Rabushka n/d).  They also beg an important research 
question, namely: Can regions embedded in autocratic political spheres maintain their 
autonomy, democratic institutions, and freedom?  This paper examines this question 
through an analysis of the political impacts of China’s integration of Hong Kong from 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in Denise Hung, Albert Wong, and Jimmy Cheung, “NPC warns on HK autonomy,” South China 
Morning Post, June 7, 2007, page C1.  
 4
1997 to the present.  This research question is significant for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is the freedom of Hong Kong’s seven million citizens.  Beyond this, the 
study of the democratization of Hong Kong may offer insights into the plausibility of 
democratization on mainland China, a critical issue in light of China’s rapid rise in the 
world’s geopolitical hierarchy.  Furthermore, as Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two 
systems” policy was initially conceived as a solution to the problem of Taiwan’s 
reunification with China, what takes place in Hong Kong also has implications for 
Taiwan, cross-strait relations, United States foreign policy, and ultimately world peace. 
The remainder of our paper is organized into four main sections.  We begin with a 
review of the literature on the democratization of Asia and Hong Kong, highlighting the 
debate between the power dependence and social forces perspectives, and introducing a 
third perspective – international linkages – that we believe can offer new insights into the 
study of Hong Kong’s future.  Second, we conduct a case study of Hong Kong’s recent 
movement toward democracy, including an evaluation of several key performance 
indicators from the World Bank governance dataset for China and Hong Kong in the 
post-1997 period.   We find that in spite of serious constraints on Hong Kong’s polity and 
flaws in their democratic institutions, the transition to Chinese authority has not 
undermined democratic governance in Hong Kong.  Third, we seek to explain this 
surprising result, arguing that greater attention must be paid to the interactions between 
Hong Kong and the mainland.  Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications 
of our findings for China, Taiwan and cross-strait relations.  We argue that in spite of the 
recent success of the “one country, two systems” model in Hong Kong, this is unlikely to 
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comfort citizens in Taiwan which – although it is also growing increasingly economically 
dependent on China – differs from Hong Kong in several fundamental ways. 
 
1. Theoretical perspectives on the democratization of Hong Kong 
The study of the democratization of Asian societies has generally been dominated 
by two theoretical perspectives: modernization theory and political culture.  
Modernization theory suggests that more affluent societies will be more likely to create 
and sustain democracy, particularly as the size of their middle class and educational 
opportunities increase (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003).  Yet 
many Asian countries such as Malaysia and Singapore have achieved a high level of 
economic development yet made only superficial progress toward democracy, opting 
instead for various forms of “soft authoritarianism” (Means 1996) or “illiberal 
democracy” (Zakaria 1997; Engberg and Ersson 2001).2  Many scholars have in turn 
attempted to explain the lack of democratic progress in the region through a reference to 
the region’s political culture or the so-called “Asian values” thought to be antithetical to 
democracy (Neher 1994).  Yet the democratization of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 
and other Asian societies largely belie this perspective even if these democracies exhibit 
greater collectivist tendencies than are found in Western democracies (Hsieh 2000).  In 
short, the limitations of these influential perspectives suggest the need for a multi-
theoretic approach in analyzing democratization in Asia.  This is especially the case when 
examining the rather unique situation of Hong Kong.    
                                                 
2
 According to Freedom House, neither Malaysia nor Singapore (nor, incidentally, Hong Kong) satisfies the 
minimum standards of “electoral democracy” (competitive elections in which all adults can vote).   
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Analyses of the democratization of Hong Kong have largely been couched in 
terms of a debate between the power dependence and social forces perspectives.  In what 
follows, we also introduce a third perspective, international linkages, which we believe 
helps shed new light on the recent democratization of Hong Kong.  Beyond providing an 
explanation for Hong Kong’s recent political transformation, each of these three 
perspectives also has its own set of implications regarding the future status of Taiwan.   
The power dependence perspective (Kuan 1991; So 2000) argues that Hong 
Kong’s integration with an autocratic central government will gradually overwhelm 
progress toward democracy in Hong Kong, resulting in a process of autocratization or a 
transition in reverse.  This process will be driven, above all else, by Hong Kong’s 
growing economic dependence on China for trade and investment, which will gradually 
reduce the autonomy and bargaining power of Hong Kong’s local elites and particularly 
those in the pro-democracy camp (Holliday et al. 2004; see also Brown 2002 and Lam 
2007).  Thus, as the two systems become one economically, they will increasingly 
become one politically, negating the entire premise of “one country, two systems.”  Were 
Taiwan to reunite with an economically ascendant and autocratic China, the power 
dependence perspective in turn carries negative implications for democracy’s survival 
there as well. 
In juxtaposition to the focus on structural economic forces found in the power 
dependence perspective, other scholars have put forward explanations for Hong Kong’s 
uneven process of democratization that emphasize the critical role of civil society, social 
forces, and “people power.”  For instance, Alvin Y. So (2000) and Ming Sing (2004) 
argue that the shifting attitudes and capabilities of local elites such as businesspeople, 
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service professionals, and grassroots activists have greatly impacted the course of 
democratization in Hong Kong.  Similarly, Loh (2006) recounts how pro-democracy 
activists, numbering between 500,000 and 700,000 people, successfully mobilized on 
July 1, 2003 against proposed legislation that sought to curtail civil liberties in Hong 
Kong in the name of fighting subversion.  Although Beijing sought the passage of the 
legislation (pertaining to Article 23 of the Basic Law) it was revised and ultimately 
withdrawn from consideration.  Such episodes speak to the fact that social forces are 
capable of exerting pressure on Beijing to preserve critical aspects of the “one country, 
two systems” concept, particularly personal liberties.  In contrast to the power 
dependence idea, the social forces perspective has slightly more optimistic implications 
for the survival of democracy in Taiwan if it were to reunite with China.   
A final perspective draws attention to the democratizing potential of international 
linkages to Western countries (Levitsky and Way 2005).  According to Levitsky and 
Way, autocracies that are linked economically, geopolitically, and socially to Western 
industrial democracies are more likely to democratize than those that are not.  
Considering its historical ties to the West, including more than a century of British 
colonial rule, Hong Kong would seem poised to make progress toward democracy.  
Moreover, the case of post-handover Hong Kong represents an interesting “reverse” test 
of the linkages proposition.  In particular, if Western linkages are democratizing, might 
China’s integration of Hong Kong have a democratizing impact on the Chinese polity?  
In stark contrast to the power dependence perspective (which anticipates a convergence 
of Hong Kong toward China’s system of autocratic rule), the reverse linkage hypothesis 
would predict a convergence of China towards Hong Kong’s system of “semi-
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democratic” (Overholt 2001) rule.3  From this perspective, furthermore, we can derive the 
implication that Beijing might be wary of reunification with a highly democratic Taiwan. 
In summary, a substantial debate exists as to what the impacts of Chinese 
integration will be on Hong Kong and the mainland.  Will Chinese influence overwhelm 
progress toward democracy in Hong Kong or is the pro-democracy movement capable of 
defending the concept of “one country, two systems”?  Moreover, might Hong Kong’s 
historical linkages to the West have a democratizing impact on the Chinese polity?  To 
answer these questions, we present a detailed case study of Hong Kong’s recent political 
evolution, including an evaluation of several key performance indicators from the World 
Bank governance dataset for Hong Kong and China in the post-1997 period.   
 
2. The Partial Democratization of Hong Kong 
 In what follows, we examine the partial democratization of Hong Kong, briefly 
reviewing the British colonial period and then turning to a review of the post-handover 
period, 1997 to the present.  Following Dahl and other democratic theorists, we employ a 
procedural minimal definition of democracy.  Such a definition emphasizes the practical 
mechanisms by which leaders are held accountable to citizens.  More specifically, Dahl 
(1982, cited in Schmitter and Karl 1991: 81) emphasized the following seven criteria:  
1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in 
elected officials. 
2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in 
which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 
3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 
4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the 
government. 
                                                 
3
 As used in the paper, the term “semi-democracy” is synonymous with “semi-authoritarianism” or a hybrid 
political regime that combines aspects of democracy with illiberal or authoritarian traits.   
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5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe 
punishment on political matters broadly defined. 
6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, 
alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. 
7) Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent association or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. 
 
To simplify this definition somewhat, Dahl’s criteria can be collapsed into three broader 
elements: rights of political participation (i.e., the right to vote and stand for office), free 
and fair elections, and the guarantee of basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, 
information, and association.  As stressed by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 
(1991: 81), for a political system to be considered a democracy, it is also critical that 
elected officials “be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected 
to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials” and that the polity “be 
able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political 
system,” a feature we label “autonomy.”  In summary, we define democracy in terms of 
four criteria: (1) rights of political participation, (2) free and fair elections, (3) civil 
liberties, and (4) autonomy.  As will be become clear in the analysis that follows, 
contemporary Hong Kong fails to satisfy even the most minimal definition of democracy, 
let alone a more robust definition of democracy that might emphasize the need for 
deliberation, checks and balances, and the rule of law.  Yet as we demonstrate below, 
recent evidence demonstrates the surprising fact that Hong Kong has undergone a process 
of partial democratization since the transition to Chinese authority in 1997.  
Historical Background: Hong Kong under British Colonial Rule, 1842-1997.  
Hong Kong was occupied by the British in 1841 and ceded to the British in perpetuity in 
1842 by the Treaty of Nanking.  Furthermore, in 1898, the adjacent hinterlands around 
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Hong Kong, known as the New Territories, were leased to the British for a ninety-nine 
year period ending in 1997.4  During the period of British colonial rule (1842-1997), 
capitalism flourished in Hong Kong and in 1949 the Chinese communists left the colony 
in British hands for economic and strategic reasons.  The colony became an economic 
gateway to China; by 1970, Hong Kong processed a substantial share of China’s foreign 
exchange and, over time, became increasingly integrated with the Pearl Delta River 
region on the mainland (Holliday et al. 2004).  Politically, Hong Kong made limited 
progress toward developing democratic institutions under the British, though a process of 
partial democratization did take place in the final decades of colonial rule as discussed 
below.  Moreover, Hong Kongers enjoyed substantial civil liberties such as freedom of 
speech and religion and the British constructed an efficient civil service and relatively 
strong judicial institutions.   
During the colonial period, the British practiced a form of “consultative 
colonialism” (Overholt 2001: 11) that was patently undemocratic.  Under this system, 
influential groups such as big business interests were consulted but ultimate political 
authority rested entirely with the British governors and their appointed legislators.  A 
process of gradual political liberalization began only as the British commenced 
negotiations with the Chinese in the 1980s and as a fledgling pro-democratic movement 
began to take shape amongst reform-minded Hong Kongers.  Sino-British negotiations in 
the early 1980s resulted in the Joint Declaration of 1984, paving the way for Hong 
Kong’s handover to China on July 1, 1997.  Under Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “one 
country, two systems” (originally conceived as a solution to the problem of Taiwanese 
                                                 
4
 As the end of the lease on the New Territories neared, the British conceded that the island of Hong Kong 
would “not be viable alone” and opted to surrender the island of Hong Kong together with the adjacent 
territories (quoted in Bundy 1988-1989: 273). 
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reunification), the Joint Declaration stipulated that Hong Kong would enjoy substantial 
autonomy in governance (save defense and foreign affairs) and economic policy for a 
period of fifty years after the handover.   
Following the ratification of the Joint Declaration in 1985, a five-year process of 
drafting Hong Kong’s constitution (known as the Basic Law) was undertaken by Beijing.  
During this critical time period, a conservative alliance was formed by big business 
interests, Beijing and (reluctantly) London to restrict Hong Kong’s emerging institutions 
to a “corporatist democratic” model relying heavily on indirect elections, while retaining 
critical features of the colonial system of appointed offices (So 2000: 368-71; see also 
Sing 2004).  By virtue of the negotiations, for example, the new seats that were added to 
Hong Kong’s legislature in the 1980s were to be elected by functional constituencies 
representing various occupational groups; increasing the number of directly elected 
offices in the Legislative Council in turn became a central issue in Hong Kong’s polity 
(Ng 1997: 14) and remains so today.  The Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, 
was eventually promulgated by the National People’s Congress in Beijing in 1990.  
Passed a year after the Tiananmen massacre, it is a politically conservative document that 
concentrates power in Hong Kong’s Chief Executive and calls for the slow introduction 
of direct elections in the Legislative Council, a disappointment for those in the 
democratic camp that had heralded the Joint Declaration as a promise of universal 
suffrage (see, e.g., Lee and Boasberg 1994).  The Basic Law stipulated that the number of 
directly elected seats in the 60-seat Council (i.e., seats drawn from geographic 
constituencies with universal suffrage) would rise gradually from 20 at the time of the 
transition in 1997 to 24 in 1999 and 30 by 2003; the remainder would be chosen by 
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functional constituencies (30 seats) and a Beijing-appointed election committee (10 seats, 
declining to 6 and then finally zero).   
Although change came slowly, the 1990s nevertheless ushered in an important 
degree of semi-democracy in Hong Kong.  The Legislative Council elections of 1991 and 
1995 were a breakthrough for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, which dominated 
the newly-introduced directly elected seats (numbering 18 in 1991 and 20 by 1995) while 
also gaining some additional representation from amongst the functional constituencies.  
In the 1995 elections, pro-democratic forces captured 26 of the 60 seats on the 
Legislative Council and Hong Kong’s Democratic Party became the single largest party.  
In the meantime, London’s newly-appointed governor, Chris Patten (1992-1997), also 
introduced new democratic reforms which expanded the definition of “functional 
constituency” to encompass a much larger electorate (essentially all workers), creating a 
short-lived situation of quasi-universal suffrage in 1995.  These important gains, 
however, encountered resistance from Beijing which in 1996 voted to replace the 1995-
1999 Legislative Council with a provisional council (stacked with pro-Beijing 
businesspeople) effective at the time of handover; the new provisional council even 
included several members who had lost electoral contests in 1995.  With the handover 
imminent, Hong Kong’s movement toward democracy appeared to be halting. 
Partial Democratization in Hong Kong, 1997-present.  In spite of numerous 
setbacks, Hong Kong has nevertheless undergone a steady process of partial 
democratization since the handover in 1997.  This can be seen most clearly in the 
Legislative Council which held new elections in 1998, 2000, 2004, and 2008.  During this 
time the number of directly elected members rose according to the formula set out in the 
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Basic Law, from 20 in 1998 all the way to 30 in 2004, while the number of 
representatives chosen by functional constituencies remained steady at 30.  Although the 
Legislative Council does not yet embody the principle of universal suffrage5 many had 
hoped for, it has never been more democratic than it is today.  The process of selecting 
the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, on the other hand, has changed very little; it remains 
in the hands of an 800-member Election Committee dominated by pro-Beijing electors.  
However, a modest advance occurred in 2007 when the Election Committee nominated 
two candidates, giving rise to Hong Kong’s first ever contested election for the Chief 
Executive in the post-handover era.   
In terms of civil liberties, Hong Kong has not witnessed the dramatic reversal 
many pessimists anticipated in 1997.  Although a few important qualifications must be 
made, Hong Kongers still enjoy the same broad personal liberties and strong rule of law 
they enjoyed during the era of British colonial rule.  Moreover, as mentioned above, 
when Beijing tried to pass anti-subversion legislation in 2003 that would have potentially 
curtailed civil liberties, the bill inspired a massive counter protest and was withdrawn. 
Governance Comparisons.  The process of Hong Kong’s partial democratization 
is well represented by recent World Bank Governance surveys.  In the surveys, 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) develop a multidimensional measure of 
governance based on the following six dimensions: political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and voice and 
accountability.  For purposes of this study we analyzed recent scores on Hong Kong and 
                                                 
5
 The Basic Law stipulated that universal suffrage could be instituted as early as 2007.  However, in a 
ruling by China’s National People’s Congress in April 2004, this possibility was rejected for the 2007 and 
2008 elections in favor of a more “gradual” approach.  A further ruling in December 2007 determined that 
that the earliest date at which representatives would be directly elected by universal suffrage would be 2017 
for the Chief Executive and 2020 for the Legislative Council (Freedom House 2008a). 
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China and, for further comparison, Taiwan and Macau.  A look at recent data (see Figure 
1 in the appendix) reveals, first and foremost, that Hong Kong is among the best-
governed polities in the world.  Hong Kong’s governance scores are in the top quartile 
globally for all six dimensions except voice and accountability.  And though the measure 
for voice and accountability6 is the weakest aspect of its governance overall, even here 
Hong Kong falls near the sixty-fifth percentile globally.  Another striking feature of the 
data is the stark variation between China on the one hand and Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan on the other.  Not only does China score lower on all six measures but, in 
contrast to the other three cases, it scores below the fiftieth percentile on all dimensions 
save government effectiveness.  Furthermore, on the dimension of voice and 
accountability, China’s score is among the lowest in the world.  Taiwan’s governance 
scores generally fall between those of Hong Kong and China, though Taiwan 
outperforms Hong Kong on the crucial aspect of voice and accountability.  The World 
Bank’s most recent data reveal that, in terms of governance, China and Hong Kong 
clearly are two different systems.   
Beyond looking at this snapshot from 2006, we can also observe important trends 
through a time series analysis of the World Bank data beginning in 1996, a useful point to 
observe the impact of the British handover.  The data reveal that Hong Kong suffered an 
immediate setback in the area of voice and accountability after the handover in 1997 with 
their governance score dropping from 0.22 in 1996 to -0.13 in 1998 and -0.15 in the year 
2000 (see Table 1).  These trends are consistent with the narrative above and reflect the 
fact that China replaced Hong Kong’s elected Legislative Council with a provisional 
                                                 
6
 As defined by the World Bank, voice and accountability measures “the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media” (Kaufmann et al. 2007: 3). 
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legislature in 1997 (a major setback for democracy), and only gradually replaced the 
legislative seats selected by the election committee with direct contests.  In spite of this 
early setback, however, the more remarkable fact is that, since 2003, Hong Kong’s voice 
and accountability scores have surpassed their pre-handover levels from 1996.  Again, 
this is consistent with the narrative above, reflecting the partial democratization of Hong 
Kong under Chinese authority. 
 
<<< TABLE 1 HERE >>>> 
 
A similar and equally surprising story is revealed when analyzing the other five 
governance indicators, including political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.  On all five dimensions, Hong Kong’s 
governance has steadily improved since 1997 and especially after the year 2000.  In short, 
the data demonstrate that Hong Kong has maintained its status as among the best 
governed polities in the world and – against most expectations – improved select 
measures of governance markedly under Chinese authoritarian rule. 
Limitations on Democracy: Hong Kong’s Semi-Authoritarian System.  In spite of 
recent advances, and the optimistic portrait provided by the World Bank survey, Hong 
Kong is still far from meeting the procedural minimal definition of democracy; that is, 
basic standards of participation, free and fair elections, civil liberties, and autonomy.   
 Basic voting rights are extremely circumscribed in Hong Kong by the continued 
predominance of officials chosen by functional constituencies, a violation of the principle 
of ‘one person, one vote.’  This is most obvious with respect to the office of the Chief 
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Executive, who is indirectly elected by the 800-member Election Committee which is 
composed mostly of representatives of occupational groups.  This results in a Chief 
Executive that is effectively unaccountable to the mass electorate in Hong Kong.   One 
half of the seats in the Legislative Council are also chosen by occupational groups which 
similarly represent only a small fraction of Hong Kong’s total electorate. 
The system of functional constituencies not only circumscribes who participates 
in the election of critical offices, but also reduces political competition since the 
occupational contests tend to be dominated by pro-Beijing candidates.  For example, in 
the 2004 Legislative Council elections, pro-democracy candidates won more than 60 
percent of the vote in the direct elections (winning 18 of 30 seats) but only claimed 25 of 
60 seats overall, as they gained so few of the seats chosen by the highly unrepresentative 
functional constituencies.  Two other aspects of Hong Kong’s politics furthermore call 
into question the fairness of elections for the Legislative Council.  The first concerns 
Hong Kong’s peculiar party-list proportional representation system used in the direct 
election contests which, as described by Cheng (2005: 144), “is meant to guarantee that 
the pro-Beijing camp can win at least one seat in each district by polling 20 to 25 percent 
of the vote.”  Pro-democracy candidates would likely fair far better under a system of 
first-past-the-post elections as they did in 1991 and 1995 under the Patten administration 
(Brown 2002: 103-104).  A second aspect concerns the strong-armed tactics of the pro-
government Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) party.  
Members of the democratic opposition allege that the DAB party uses dirty tactics to 
extract contributions and vote pledges from the business community and spreads false 
propaganda about their opponents, among other forms of electoral intimidation (Brown 
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2002: 110-111; Cheng 2005: 143; Freedom House 2008a).  The net result of these 
features of Hong Kong’s politics is a system that is accurately described by the 
Economist (2007) as one of “relatively free elections and predetermined outcomes.” 
In the area of civil liberties, Hong Kong enjoys relative freedom.  Here too, 
though, important qualifications must be made.  For example, while the freedom of press 
is broadly guaranteed, occasional pressures from Beijing (as well as the fear of such 
pressure) have resulted in a high level of self censorship especially on politically 
sensitive issues like Taiwan (Brown 2002; Economist 2007; Freedom House 2007; see 
also Holbig 2003).7  Freedom of religion is broadly tolerated in Hong Kong with the 
conspicuous exception of Falun Gong, which was declared an “evil cult” by former Hong 
Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa (in office 1997-2005).  Furthermore, Falun Gong 
practitioners from abroad have faced arrest and deportation.  Finally, complaints have 
also surfaced with respect to freedom of assembly, movement, and academic freedom. 
In terms of its autonomy, Hong Kong’s polity remains heavily subordinate to 
Beijing’s autocratic government.  Not only are critical offices appointed by the central 
government but the ability to amend and interpret the Basic Law resides entirely with 
Beijing.  Indeed, decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization are ultimately made in 
Beijing and interference from the mainland has increased in recent years (Cheng 2007).  
Moreover, barring dramatic reforms on the mainland, this is very unlikely to change.   
In conclusion, and in spite of the progress noted, Hong Kong cannot be 
considered a democracy today owing to limitations on its autonomy, political 
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 According to Freedom House (2007), Hong Kong’s media is regarded as “free” though it is at the very 
threshold of being considered “partly free.”   
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participation and competition, and, to a much lesser extent, civil liberties.8  If we were to 
expand our conception of democracy to include a broader set of features, one would also 
encounter faults in the system of checks and balances in Hong Kong’s polity which 
features a relatively weak legislature (in terms of lawmaking powers) and a powerful 
executive capable of potentially overriding judicial checks by appealing decisions to the 
National People’s Congress in Beijing.9 
 
3. Explaining the Partial Democratization of Hong Kong after Re-unification 
Although Hong Kong has not yet achieved true democracy, and appears unlikely 
to do so in the near future, an assessment of the past ten years nevertheless supports the 
conclusion that the transition to Chinese authority has not undermined democratic 
governance in Hong Kong.  In fact, Hong Kong has in several respects grown more 
democratic while preserving the personal liberties introduced in the era of British 
colonialism.  What explains this surprising result?  To what extent do the power 
dependence, social forces, and international linkages perspectives help account for the 
recent changes in Hong Kong?  What are the implications of these findings for the future 
of China, Taiwan, and cross-strait relations?  It is to these questions that we now turn. 
In contrast to the pessimism that accompanied the handover in 1997, China has 
largely honored the principle of “one country, two systems.”  Indeed, ten years after the 
transition, Hong Kong remains a separate and semi-democratic system embedded within 
                                                 
8
 Seen from a comparative perspective, Hong Kong represents a peculiar anomaly in the contemporary 
world (though not historically) as a country that enjoys robust civil liberties but not basic political rights – a 
form of “liberal autocracy” (Zakaria 1997: 29). 
9
 For instance, in 1999, a ruling by Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal on the right of children of Hong 
Kong parents born on the mainland to abode in Hong Kong was appealed by the government and duly 
overturned by the National People’s Congress in Beijing based on their interpretation of the Basic Law. 
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a larger autocratic whole.  As pro-democracy leader Martin C.M. Lee (1998: 5) 
summarizes, “although China does not have democracy, it now has some elected 
democrats on Chinese soil representing political parties independent of Communist 
control.”  To what extent do the power dependence, social forces, and international 
linkages perspectives help explain the recent changes in Hong Kong?   
Power dependence.  Advocates of the power dependence perspective see 
worrying long-term trends in Hong Kong and anticipate diminished leverage on the part 
of Hong Kong’s democratic movement as it becomes economically integrated with the 
mainland.  For decades, Hong Kong has served as a gateway for China’s economic 
growth and modernization and, undoubtedly, China has been careful to preserve this role.  
Yet, as proponents of the power dependence perspective are quick to point out, the 
relationship has grown increasingly uneven for Hong Kong.  Indeed, while Hong Kong 
continues to enjoy a per capita income which is nearly eight times higher than in the 
mainland, it is dwarfed (in absolute terms) by China’s massive economy.10  This is 
plainly evident with respect to trade where Hong Kong is far more trade dependent on 
China than vice-versa; more than 45 percent of Hong Kong’s imports and exports are 
associated with China whereas China has a relatively diverse range of global and regional 
trading partners, including the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Germany, 
to name a few.  Furthermore, Hong Kong has also grown increasingly reliant on 
investment concessions and tourism from the mainland, notably as a result of the Closer 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) established by Beijing in 2003.  Finally, with 
the growth of capitalism on the mainland and China’s entry into the World Trade 
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 According to the CIA World Fact Book, Hong Kong’s GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) in 
2007 was $42,000 compared to $5,300 in China. 
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Organization as well as the rise of Shanghai as an international commercial center, Hong 
Kong’s status as the international gateway to China has diminished; Hong Kong is now 
one of several “gateways” to China.11  Nevertheless, even as Hong Kong has gradually 
lost economic leverage to China, this has not yet entirely stymied the island’s slow 
movement toward democracy.  Although time could reverse the trends we have observed 
(and we remain skeptical that Chinese authorities will grant increased autonomy to Hong 
Kong any time soon), we do not yet find strong evidence of a process of autocratization 
taking place in Hong Kong. 
Social forces.  A second interpretation of Hong Kong’s political evolution is 
offered by the social forces perspective.  Advocates of this perspective draw attention to 
the ways in which the attitudes and capabilities of local elites such as businesspeople and 
grassroots activists shape the course of democratization in Hong Kong.  As our summary 
of the partial democratization of Hong Kong makes clear, social forces have played an 
important role in safeguarding Hong Kong’s liberties, particularly during the 2003 
protests against anti-subversion legislation pertaining to Article 23 of the Basic Law.  
Indeed, since 2003, the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has organized a series 
of massive rallies – held annually on July 1st, the anniversary of the transfer of 
sovereignty – calling for universal suffrage and other progressive demands, such as 
preserving the autonomy of Radio and Television Hong Kong (RTHK), one of the 
island’s most respected broadcasters.  While Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement has 
rarely triumphed against the wishes of the central government (which continues to dictate 
                                                 
11
 Richard R. Vuylsteke, the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, interviewed in Hong Kong 
on June 30, 2008. 
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key aspects of policy), social forces certainly provide part of the explanation of Hong 
Kong’s movement toward democracy.   
International linkages.   Both the power dependence and social forces 
perspectives contribute critical insights into Hong Kong’s recent political history.  In 
addition to these viewpoints, we argue that a third perspective – international linkages –
helps to draw attention to the dynamic interaction between Hong Kong, the West, and the 
mainland.  According to this perspective, autocracies that are linked economically, 
geopolitically, and socially to Western democracies are more likely to democratize than 
those that are not.  Such an interpretation is consistent with our findings that Hong Kong 
has undergone a process of partial democratization.  Moreover, this theory provides a 
provocative implication: if Western linkages are democratizing, might China’s 
integration of (a highly Westernized) Hong Kong have a democratizing impact on the 
Chinese polity?  Seen from this perspective, the forces shaping Hong Kong should not be 
thought of as unidirectional but interactive; just as China impacts Hong Kong so too 
Hong Kong impacts China, though the impact is rarely symmetrical.  In addition, China 
itself is becoming more connected to the West, especially the European Union and the 
United States.  Its trade and investment ties to the Western world are at an all time high, 
and global linkages in politics and society are growing too (Alon and McIntyre 2008).  
The “coming out party” of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, intended to showcase China’s 
emergence as a major global power, also demonstrated many of China’s own 
sensitivities, including Tibetan independence, media freedom, and political rights.12 
                                                 
12
 Indeed, against expectations that China might soften rights restrictions ahead of the Olympic Games, the 
government increased restrictions on the freedom of movement and information and amplified surveillance, 
harassment, and detention of petitioners and activists (Freedom House 2009). 
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Of course, as advocates of the power dependence perspective rightfully point out, 
the interaction between China and Hong Kong is not an interaction of equals.  
Nevertheless, to quote a well-known pro-democracy leader in Hong Kong, even if Hong 
Kong is on China’s periphery, “the periphery is often where the seeds of new ideas are 
sown” (Loh 2006: 294).  The international linkage perspective thus draws attention to the 
ways in which the integration of Hong Kong has brought China into much greater contact 
with the ideas and values of the Western world.  Zheng and Keat (2007) argue, for 
example, that Beijing has (however reluctantly) been forced to speak the “language” of 
the democratic opposition in Hong Kong (2007: 247).   
In other respects, however, the evidence is inconclusive.  For example, though 
Freedom House (2008b) shows a modest improvement in China’s civil liberties after 
1997, the World Bank data indicates that improvements in voice and accountability in 
China have hardly moved in lockstep with Hong Kong (see Table 2).  Moreover, many 
remain skeptical that the linkages between Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland – 
including substantial investments, trade and tourism (including a paragon of Western life, 
Disney) – will have a political impact in China that goes beyond mere exposure to a 
consumeristic lifestyle in Hong Kong.  Many maintain that in spite of increased linkages 
between the two territories, Hong Kong is still Hong Kong and China is still China.13  In 
short, while Hong Kong’s historical linkages to the West provide a compelling 
explanation for the island’s recent movement toward democracy (and are consistent with 
the social forces explanation), it would be premature to suggest that linkages between 
Hong Kong and China are having a democratizing impact on the mainland. 
                                                 
13
 Tao Li, Chief Research Officer of the One Country Two Systems Research Institute in Hong Kong, 
interviewed in Hong Kong, July 4, 2008.  Similar views regarding the political impact of China’s linkages 
to Hong Kong were expressed by members of the American Consulate General in Hong Kong.   
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<<< TABLE 2 HERE >>>> 
 
Considering the evidence of Hong Kong’s recent movement toward democracy, 
what explains Beijing’s surprising tolerance of elected democrats on their own soil?  
Undoubtedly, China’s broader geo-strategic interests of international legitimacy, 
continued economic development, and peaceful reunification with Taiwan help explain 
their seemingly pragmatic posture vis-à-vis Hong Kong (Zheng and Keat 2007: 248-49).  
Yet there is another interpretation of China’s position, namely that semi-democracy in 
Hong Kong is not nearly as threatening to China as Beijing might have once anticipated.  
Christine Loh (2006: 304), for example, claims that, “Hong Kong may be redefining the 
Chinese psyche’s fear of instability and ‘chaos’ (luan).”  China may have less to fear 
from a semi-democratic Hong Kong for a number of reasons.  First, from an economic 
vantage, in the post-Deng era, mainland China has rapidly converged toward Hong 
Kong’s economic model, so fears about the destabilizing impact of capitalism have 
eroded.  Second, from a political vantage, Beijing has learned to manage Hong Kong’s 
political system in such a way that the final outcomes are largely proscribed in Beijing’s 
favor through a mixture of democratic and semi-democratic institutions and a fair amount 
of political manipulation.  A third reason stems from the weakness of the democratic 
opposition as well as the pragmatism, moderation and restraint of Hong Kong citizens in 
general who have little desire for political revolution.  Indeed, many in Hong Kong have 
welcomed the positive benefits associated with increased linkages to the mainland.  For 
instance, Chinese tourism, investments, and improved trade integration arguably helped 
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stave off a major financial crisis in Hong Kong following the dot.com bust and SARS 
outbreak in the early 2000s.14  Furthermore, in late 2008, Beijing announced a 14-point 
plan, including tax rebates and liberalized visas, to help the city through the recent global 
economic crisis.15   
 
4. Implications for China, Taiwan and cross-strait relations 
As indicated above, each of these three perspectives we have considered – power 
dependence, social forces, and international linkages – has its own set of implications 
regarding the future status of Taiwan.  We therefore conclude with a short discussion of 
the implications of our findings for Taiwan and cross-strait relations.  The Chinese 
government maintains that the “one country, two systems” model practiced in Hong 
Kong (and Macao) represents a flexible model for the incorporation of Taiwan into 
China.  In principle, the premise that both China and Taiwan are part of “One China” was 
jointly recognized by government representatives in the “1992 Consensus.”  However, 
whether a legitimate consensus was truly achieved and how it should be interpreted 
remain subjects of intense controversy in Taiwanese politics.   
A crucial question concerns whether or not the relative success of the “one 
country, two systems” model in Hong Kong will bring true comfort to citizens in Taiwan, 
which differs from Hong Kong in several fundamental ways.  Many argue, for example, 
that the differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan are so substantial that they make the 
notion that China can use Hong Kong as a “proxy” for Taiwan (i.e., a positive 
inducement for reunification) rather unrealistic.  For one, Taiwan is larger in size and 
                                                 
14
 Mark Michelson, Associate Director-General, Invest Hong Kong, The Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, interviewed in Hong Kong, June 30, 2008. 
15
 See “Beijing helps HK fight crisis,” South China Morning Post, December 20, 2008, pages A1 and A3.   
 25
population and more geographically remote from China than is Hong Kong.  It is also 
less economically dependent on China for its prosperity16, though this situation is 
changing rapidly in China’s favor.17  Indeed, Taiwan’s increasing economic integration 
with China is a central fissure in Taiwanese politics. 
In any case, these geographic and economic distinctions between Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are rather superficial when compared to other crucial differences.  Far more 
important is the fact that Taiwan has now been self-governing for several decades and, as 
Agnes Bundy (1988-1989: 283) points out, “has maintained its own armed forces and 
independent international ties during this period of self-government.”  This stands in 
marked contrast not only to Hong Kong’s recent experience of British colonial rule but 
also to Hong Kong’s status as a Special Administrative Region within China.  Moreover, 
since the rise of competitive party politics in the 1980s and 1990s – marked by the defeat 
of the once-dominant Kuomintang (KMT) party in 2000 – Taiwan is rightfully regarded 
as a full democracy.  Thus, although China has made a gradual effort to shepherd Hong 
Kong toward semi-democracy, the Taiwanese still regard Hong Kong’s polity as 
autocratic.  Indeed, while the two dominant factions in Taiwanese politics differ from one 
another regarding the optimal policies Taiwan should adopt towards China, they are 
united in their commitment to Taiwanese democracy.  Democratic social forces are 
therefore unlikely to accept any arrangement that would compromise Taiwan’s political 
autonomy. 
                                                 
16
 According the CIA World Fact Book, for instance, China accounts for over 45% of Hong Kong’s imports 
and exports.  In contrast, China accounts for 12% of Taiwanese imports (second behind Japan) and 22.5% 
of exports. 
17
 For example, a process of “hollowing out” is often used to describe the loss of jobs and output from 
Taiwan. Observers point to a massive relocation of large sections of industry (including the high tech 
sector) from Taiwan into China in the past two decades (Holliday et al. 2004).  China has also risen to 
become Taiwan’s leading trade and investment partner.  
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What relevance do international linkages have for Taiwan?  Taiwan itself is 
presented as one of many illustrations of Levitsky and Way’s supposition that Western 
linkages can have a democratizing impact on competitive authoritarian regimes.  An 
interesting question therefore arises as to how Beijing plans to incorporate yet another—
more vigorous—source of democratic ideas on its periphery.  This perspective has 
particular relevance as Taiwan’s integration with China deepens, not only in an economic 
sense but in a socio-culture sense as well.18  Under the current Taiwanese president, Ma 
Ying-jeou, cross-strait linkages (including, notably, cross-strait flights) have expanded 
considerably.  As Bruce Gilley (2010) argues, furthermore, these growing cross-strait 
linkages, along with a deepening process of normalization, suggest that Taiwan could 
play an increasing role in China’s domestic political liberalization.  Reunification with 
Taiwan, should it occur, will only deepen China’s exposure to democratic ideals. 
In light of these facts, it is not surprising that Beijing, Hong Kong, and Taipei (not 
to mention the United States) have settled into the peculiar equilibrium that they now find 
themselves.  While captivated by its economic potential, Hong Kong and Taiwan remain 
wary of Beijing’s influence.  Similarly, while less economically reliant on Hong Kong 
and Taiwan for trade and investment as it once was, the mainland is wary of political 
instability along its periphery and cognizant of its own fragile international reputation.  In 
Hong Kong, Beijing has found a partial solution, the managed introduction of semi-
democracy.  Meanwhile in Taiwan, Beijing and the United States have opted for a 
continuation of the ambiguous status quo.  This situation looks likely to continue into the 
foreseeable future.
                                                 
18
 Some officials maintain that Taiwan’s cultural linkages to China are actually closer and more robust than 
those of Hong Kong.  Interview with Shiu Sin Por, member of the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Central Policy Unit, Hong Kong, July 3, 2008. 
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Table 1: Voice and Accountability scores for Hong Kong, 1996-2006 
Year 
 
Governance Score 
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
Percentile Rank 
(0-100) 
Standard Error 
2006 0.55 64.9 0.2 
2005 0.59 66.3 0.2 
2004 0.52 64.4 0.2 
2003 0.33 58.2 0.21 
2002 0.12 51.4 0.21 
2000 -0.15 45.7 0.28 
1998 -0.13 46.6 0.29 
1996 0.22 56.5 0.26 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Voice and Accountability scores for Hong Kong and China, 1996-2006 
Year 
 
Governance Score (Hong Kong) 
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
Governance Score (China) 
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
2006 0.55 -1.66 
2005 0.59 -1.46 
2004 0.52 -1.33 
2003 0.33 -1.36 
2002 0.12 -1.40 
2000 -0.15 -1.38 
1998 -0.13 -1.39 
1996 0.22 -1.66 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) 
 
 
 
Appendix - Figure 1: Governance Indicators 
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